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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional notions and rules of professionalism in the legal profes-
sion have been premised on particular conceptions of the lawyer’s role,
usually as an advocate,1 occasionally as a counselor, advisor, transaction
planner, government official, decision maker and in the recent parlance
of one of this symposium’s participants—a “statesman [sic].”2 As we ex-
amine what professionalism means and what rules should be used to
regulate its activity, it is important to ask some foundational questions:
For what ends should our profession be used? What does law offer soci-
ety? How should lawyers exercise their particular skills and competen-
cies?
While it is true that the lawyer is an advocate and uses her skills to
persuade others on behalf of her client—her principal—lawyers are also
“officers of the court” with loyalties and allegiances to the public good,
and sometimes, its agencies. As others have elaborated, lawyers have
duties to practice justice.3 And, we have heard much in this symposium,
as well as in modern professional discourse, about the tensions between
the paradigms of “law as a profession” and “law as a business.”4
I want to suggest, as I have before,5 that lawyers serve other functions
as well and that our rules of professionalism do not adequately reflect
                                                                                                                                                
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Chair, CPR-Institute for
Dispute Resolution-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR. Thanks to Pro-
fessor Jeff Stempel for the invitation to return to Florida State University College of Law and to
the other symposium participants for stimulating thoughts and comments.
1. See  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. T EX. L. REV. 407
(1997) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolu tion]; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers : Lawyering as Only
Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS  631 (1997) [hereinafter Menkel Meadow, Silences
of the Restatement].
2. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1994).
3. See  DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND J USTICE : AN ETHICAL STUDY xvii, xxii (1988); see also
WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF J USTICE : A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS  12 (1998) (suggesting
that ethical rules are one way to “alleviate the moral anxiety” of lawyers).
4. See  Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and
the Law-As-Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. S T. U. L. REV. 9 (1999) [hereinafter Pearce, Law Day
2050]. The profession-business tension has been with us since at least the early 18th cen tury,
though some would claim the rhetoric about different masters as justice or manna has been
with us since the beginning of American legal hi story. See  LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW (1985).
5. See  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem Solving Pedagogy Seriously, 49 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make Them: In te-
grating ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REV. 1995 (1993); Carrie Menkel-
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some of these other functions—the lawyer as problem solver,6 peace-
maker7 and third party neutral, as some examples. Too much of the de-
bate about professionalism, it seems to me, has been clustered around a
series of false dichotomies or polarizations—business versus profession,
client defense (zeal) versus truth, adversarialism versus compromise,
criminal versus civil, public versus private, client service and autonomy
vs. justice, individualism vs. system, rules of law and discretion—as if
our actual practices do not often combine aspects of these claimed oppo-
sites simultaneously.
Law is a profession and clearly is concerned with, and suffering from,
market competition and other economic influences. Lawyers simultane-
ously serve their clients and have duties and obligations to the profes-
sion itself and to the larger society and its public agencies. Lawyers often
serve clients in adversarial settings like litigation or contested transac-
tional negotiations, but they also serve clients in non-adversarial roles
where there is no adversary at all (will drafting, business advice) or even
serve people as lawyers without having them in formal client relation-
ships (serving on boards of directors, acting as mediators, facilitators or
consensus builders).8 There are no easy stopping points along many of
these continua.
To the extent that lawyers and legal academics have an obligation to
diagnose, solve and reform legal issues, it seems imperative that we take
account of the complexity of lawyer roles and not use simple “para-
digms” to obscure more functional complexity. As a former practicing
lawyer and a long-time ethics teacher, I have questioned the desirability
of transsubstantivity in both ethical and procedural rules,9 when func-
tional specificity may be required for more clarity of role, guidance nec-
essary for professional actors and clearer statements of purpose for the
consumer of such services. Though professions often desire general rules
of ethics to unify and mark the boundaries of what a profession is, in-
creasingly, general ethics and professionalism may be so general and ab-
stract as to be of little use both to those who need to act as professionals,
with guidance from appropriate rules and standards, and to those who
need to judge the actions of professionals—both consumers and regula-
tors of various kinds.10 To the extent that we too narrowly define the
                                                                                                                                                
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View ].
6. See  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Art and Science of Problem-Solving Negotiation,
TRIAL, June, 1999 at 48; Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View , supra note 5.
7. It was Abraham Lincoln, that consummate advocate, who exhorted his profession to:
“discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to
them how the nominal winner is often a real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a
peacemaker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will still be
business enough [sic].” Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture, in  THE
COLLECTIVE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SUPPLEMENT 1832-1865, 18-19 (Roy Basler ed.,
1974). In the original speech he said “never encourage” rather than “discourage” litigation.
8. See  CONSENSUS BUILDING H ANDBOOK (Larry Susskind ed., 1999).
9. See  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995); see also Eleanor Myers, “Simple Truths”
About Moral Education, 45 AM . U. L. R EV. 823 (1996).
10. In general, regulation of professionals has itself become more complex, including, for
the legal profession, disciplinary bodies in the states, court decisions through disqualification,
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frame or prism through which we define lawyers’ roles, we may be pro-
viding inadequate ethical guidance for lawyers and too narrowly crafting
what services lawyers can provide.11 In short, this is an argument for
functional ethics, recognizing a broader set of functions for the lawyer in
some non-adversarial settings than current conceptions of ethics or
professionalism seem to want to recognize.
For some, lawyers are the servants of a system that utilizes “the rule
of law” to restrain what might be the despotic or corrupt rule of particu-
lar individuals. Lawyers are thus agents of a particular system that has
its own justification. David Luban, for example, has examined whether
the lawyer’s activities as an advocate in an adversary system can be jus-
tified by the defense of the larger system in which the lawyer is lo-
cated—the adversary system. 12 Others have framed the lawyer’s role in
different ways: the “transaction cost engineer,”13 the “process archi-
tect,”14 the purveyor of justice or officer of the court15 with “referential”
ethical responsibility placed in the “reputational” market (for transac-
tional work) or a jurisprudential or legalistic definition of “systemic”
justice (for litigation). To the extent that lawyers serve different func-
tions, with their particular expertise located in different process func-
tions, it may be that ethics will have to be specifically related to function
and form of the activity within specific and, perhaps, different institu-
tional settings.16
In a recent book examining adversarial ethics (and finding them
wanting), Arthur Isak Applbaum acknowledges the ethics of professional
function (and suggests these can go too far) by recounting the ability of
Charles-Henri Sanson in maintaining his position as Executioner of
                                                                                                                                                
sanction and withdrawal motions, federal agencies with their own rules of admission and prac-
tice (IRS and SEC, as examples), and increasingly, the transdisciplinary actions of professional
associations that either certify or hope to regulate best practices in some professional fields,
such as mediation or paralegals. See, e.g., AAA/ABA/SPIDR, MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
FOR MEDIATORS (1995); L. Ray Patterson, LAWYER’ S LAW: PROCEDURAL, MALPRACTICE AND
DISCIPLINARY ISSUES  (4th ed. 1999).
11. In this essay I am principally concerned with lawyers’ roles in dispute resolution and
what I call “transactional ADR,” but there are many other related issues of other functions to be
performed by lawyers currently being addressed by the ABA Commission on Multi-Disciplinary
Practice. See  Report (visited June 9, 1999)
 <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html> (suggesting Model Rule revisions to permit,
with certain rules and regulations, multi-disciplinary practice of lawyers with nonlawyers and
allowing fee-splitting with other non-legal professionals; see also Ritchenya Shepard, Lawyers,
Accountants and Beyond, NAT’L L.J. , June 21, 1999, at A-1.
12. See  David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse , in  THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’
ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS  (David Luban ed., 1984).
13. Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pri cing ,
94 YALE L. J.  239, 244 (1984).
14. ROBERT MNOOKIN, BEYOND WINNING: HOW LAWYERS H ELP CLIENTS CREATE VALUE IN
NEGOTIATION (forthcoming).
15. See  SIMON, supra note 3, at 9.
16. I have often thought of Lon Fuller as the “jurisprude” of ADR. His series of articles
discusses the particular structures and competencies of adjudication, arbitration and mediation
as different legal processes. In the debates about ADR, the 1950s Legal Process school’s insights
about “institutional competence” continue, suggesting that different forms and institutions
within the legal system may also require different ethical systems. See  Menkel-Meadow, Ethics
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at 415-21, 417 n.41; see also  David Luban, R e-
discovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. L EGAL ETHICS  801, 807 (1998).
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Paris through changes in regime from Louis XVI through all the stages of
the French Revolution, because of his extreme professional and func-
tional ethics17—he was simply a professional executioner and the under-
lying political regime for whom he did his work did not matter. 18 What
did matter was how and with what professional standards of quality he
performed his work. I want to suggest the danger of Sanson’s suc-
cess—the assumption in our own code of legal ethics, that a lawyer is a
lawyer and that all lawyers can be regulated, by the same rules, regard-
less of how or for whom they perform their services.
Though the analogy is not totally apt, Sanson’s ethics as an Execu-
tioner transcending political regime is a bit like the expectation of our
current ethical codes—that a lawyer can be governed by a unitary code as
long as he is called a “lawyer,” regardless of whether his “political re-
gime” is the adversarial world of advocacy or not. Some have suggested
that we can avoid these problems by claiming that a lawyer who per-
forms non-adversarial roles, like arbitrator-judge or mediator, is simply
not acting as a lawyer. 19 However, I have argued otherwise, suggesting
that such roles do implicate the use of law and its “practice” in the reli-
ance third parties may place on legal interpretations, even if they are not
clients.20
Though the adversary system is both defended and found wanting for
its claim that it is the best method for learning the truth,21 or, alterna-
tively, for protecting individual rights, 22 or, because when compared with
various alternatives, it is considered the fairest by participants,23 other
forms of legal and non-legal problem solving are growing in importance
because they emphasize other values. A recent reform effort in the
United Kingdom, for example, has borrowed aspects of the continental
inquisitorial system by using single, court-appointed experts to reduce
                                                                                                                                                
17. See  ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM , ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES : THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN
PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE  (1999).
18. This extreme form of “functional” professional ethics is also examined in Kazuo Ishi-
guro’s novel, REMAINS OF THE DAY (1989). See  Rob Atkinson, How the Butler was Made to Do
It: The Perverted Professionalism of the Remains of the Day , 105 YALE L.J.  177 (1995); see also
David Luban, Stevens’s Professionalism and Ours , 38 WM . & MARY L. REV. 297 (1996).
19. See  Symposium, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, NIDR FORUM , June 1997; see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. When ADR Is Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront
Conflicts Issues, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 147 (1994); Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers
Who Mediate Are Not Practicing Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 74 (1996); Geetha
Ravindra, When Mediation Becomes the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 94 (1997); N.J. Panel Finds ADR Is Part of Law Practice , 12 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG . 87 (1994).
20. See  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 57 (1996); see also  To the Editors: Is Mediation the Practice of Law Redux ,
NIDR NEWS, Nov. 1997-Jan. 1998, at 1 (1998).
21. See  LUBAN, supra note 3, at 68-74; see also  MARVIN E. FRANKEL , PARTISAN J USTICE
(1980); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM . & MARY L. R EV. 5, 5-6 (1996) (providing a critique of the adver-
sary system and its binary nature) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Trouble].
22. See  Monroe Freedman, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER’S ETHICS  16 (1990); Monroe Freed -
man, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM . & MARY L. REV. 63 (1996).
23. See  JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL J USTICE : A P SYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975); see also John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Decision -
making, 86 H ARV. L. REV. 386, 386-88 (1972) (discussing research that appears to support the
validity of an adversarial model).
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adversarialism among competing and “bought” experts and is suggesting
court-structured fee schedules (borrowed from Germany) to add pre-
dictability and, presumably, access to legal services. 24
As Bill Simon recently demonstrated so eloquently, even the ethics of
the adversary system are self-contradictory, or, in the old words of criti-
cal legal studies, “indeterminate” because the guiding ethical concepts of
the “zealous advocate” limited by the “bounds of the law” are often either
in tension with each other or have no clear lines of demarcation.25 Fur-
thermore, as Simon and others have argued, in our current legal culture,
the “zeal” of the advocate for his client has trumped whatever “supple-
mentary” values are intended to be expressed in the duties of the “officer
of the court” who has responsibilities to the larger system of justice.26
Even the notion of “officer of the court” as an ethical counterpoint to
consider the justice or fairness of one’s acts as a zealous advocate falls
far short of today’s law practice realities. If taken literally, the lawyer’s
duty to be an officer “of the court,” intending to connote some loyalty to
the system, beyond the client’s demands, would seem to apply to those
matters in litigation, or at least those in anticipation of litigation.27 How
should the lawyer’s duty to the system be expressed for non-court lawyer
activities—the lawyer as counselor, will drafter, negotiator, or, in the
major role which is my theme here, as third party neutral?28 The lawyer
is not always an officer of the court when performing legal tasks; thus,
the reference point for professionalism and ethics must be something
beyond the lawyer’s duty to a tribunal or specific office, whether located
in a specific institution or within the more generalized institution of liti-
gation.
I have written at length elsewhere that the adversarial system, though
serving some functions, is potentially deficient in meeting some human
goals.29 To the extent that the structure of adversarialism privileges ar-
gument, debate, bipolar or binary solutions and often channels disputes
or issues into simplistic two-sided treatment, this stylized form prevents
recognition of the more common ways in which legal problems occur in
our modern world. Even conventional lawsuits these days are often dis-
                                                                                                                                                
24. See  Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report, REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON
THE CIVIL J USTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (July 1996).
25. See  SIMON, supra note 3, at 7-8.
26. See  id . at 9-10 (arguing for a discretionary approach to lawyering that considers a wide
range of circumstances “to promote justice”).
27. For those cases that are actually filed, we know that over 90% are resolved without
trial in court. This does not mean, as many continue to suggest, that 90% of cases settle. Many,
in fact, are resolved by judicial decision or other means (motions for summary judgment, etc.).
See  Herbert Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray , 70 JUDICATURE 161, 161
(1986). Of course, “officer of the court” also implicates the complex ethical dispute about when
lawyers as advisors (particularly in regulatory advice giving) are acting on the basis of “antici-
pation” of litigation, as became an issue in the Lincoln Savings and Loan disciplinary charges.
See  Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, The Kaye Scholer File, in REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 729, 731 (1992).
28. I have continually raised the issue of whether a lawyer appearing in a private media-
tion, arbitration, or in a court-annexed program is appearing before a “tribunal” as defined in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or, now, in the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1; see also
Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restatement, supra note 1.
29. See  Menkel-Meadow, Trouble, supra note 21.
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putes or issues between and among multiple parties (i.e. environmental
clean-ups, mass torts, securities, reform of governmental entities, con-
sumer actions), often with multiple issues at stake—what Lon Fuller
called “multi-plex” disputes, which are not susceptible to litigious on/off,
yes/no solutions.30 These kinds of cases may require complex solutions,
with future-oriented rules, transactions or duties and cannot adequately
be served by the “limited remedial imaginations” of courts.31
Some lawyers represent entities, either from within or without, and
must manage internal organizational or “constituency” problems32 as a
matter of advice and counsel, whether or not there are particular legal
disputes with the outside world. Modern in-house counsel or ombuds-
man-like lawyers may deal as much with internal organizational issues
and management than with outside disputes, calling for very different
skills and approaches to legal problem solving.33 Other lawyers are en-
gaged to help individuals or entities form organizations or partnerships,
draft wills or contracts, and may or may not have “issues” or “adversar-
ies” in the way the adversarial model of lawyering understands them.
If finding the truth, learning what happened in the past, and pro-
tecting individual rights are not the only values a legal system should ex-
press, then perhaps we need to recast the goals that lawyers and the legal
system might seek to achieve. Furthermore, we might need to rethink
the rules that are intended to guide and regulate lawyers seeking to
achieve those different goals. What if, for example, we saw lawyers and
the legal system seeking to solve not only client problems, but also
seeking to work on community-based or even larger social problems?
What if needs, as well as rights, were part of the lawyer’s vocabulary?
Notions of loyalty would be different. So, would there need to be differ-
ent rules regarding confidentiality? If, as in other cultures, we began to
value harmony34 and peace, as much as contention and rights, lawyers
seeking to reduce, rather than increase, conflict might have to operate in
different ways.
If, as I suggested some years ago, and which is now becoming a more
popular notion with many, including the Attorney General,35 we consid-
ered the lawyer as problem-solver, then lawyers would engage in for-
ward-thinking, planning and preventative strategies, as well as retro-
                                                                                                                                                
30. Lon Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. R EV. 305, 306-07
(1971).
31. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 5 (suggesting that courts have
limited remedial imaginations, not because judges are not imaginative, but because common
law and statutes and the very structure of the legal system limit what courts are a llowed to do
and what solutions they are allowed to see).
32. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978) (discussing
complex duties of lawyers to organizations); DAVID MURRAY, ETHICS IN ORGANIZATIONS :
VALUES, CODES, VISION, STRATEGIES , ACTION (1997).
33. See  Ellen Waxman & Howard Gadlin, A Breed Apart: An Ombudsman Serves as a
Buffer Between and Among Individuals and Large Institutions, DISP. RESOL. M AG., Summer
1998, at 21.
34. For a trenchant critique of “false” harmony values in our mediation culture, see Laura
Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Move-
ment to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993).
35. See  Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1999).
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spective defenses and claims. What should the defense lawyer’s respon-
sibilities be to the criminal defendant who has been successfully de-
fended—acquitted—but who might in fact be guilty? What should the
lawyer’s responsibility be to prevent future crimes, including not just the
commonly mentioned individual crimes of burglary, etc., but corporate
crimes of pollution, unfair trade practices, inhumane employment poli-
cies? What responsibility should a prosecutor feel for the conviction he
achieves when he knows the defendant is headed for a prison system
that will educate him in new ways of committing crimes?36 What respon-
sibility should a lawyer feel for the community when he has won a zon-
ing variance or tax relief for a developer? These examples suggest that
there might be commitments beyond the client when the lawyer’s own
actions or work allow the client to do things that affect others. Our cur-
rent rules recognize that lawyers may be ethically liable when their ac-
tions have been implicated in their clients’ fraudulent acts.37 To the ex-
tent that lawyers’ actions cause harm to others, what responsibilities
should the lawyer have for preventing or resolving such problems before
they occur?
What if every law student and lawyer asked at the beginning of every
traditional case: What caused this dilemma? This problem? Is the dis-
pute just the tip of an iceberg where the whole iceberg needs melting?
What is the larger context in which this problem is situated? What would
need to be done to fix the problem or to address the concerns of the par-
ties and those affected by whatever decisions might be made? This more
pro-active approach to legal problem solving would involve the lawyer in
different functions and tasks than those now often employed within tra-
ditional legal paradigms and skills. Problem solving and mediation lit-
erature commonly speak of lawyers who define problems narrowly (dis-
pute resolvers or litigators) and those who seek broader issue definition
for broader problem resolution.38 Should one’s ethical duties be com-
mensurate with the size of the problem or responsibilities that one takes
on?39
Lawyers, for example, might be instrumental in convening meetings
of interested groups40 seeking to resolve issues before, during, or after
lawsuits, using very different techniques than traditional adversarial ap-
proaches. In a variety of complex disputes, including block grant alloca-
tion, environmental clean up and siting, municipal funding and govern-
                                                                                                                                                
36. See  Robert Suro, Law & Order: Counting Toward 100,000 More Police, WASH. POST ,
June 1, 1999, at A-13 (excerpting Janet Reno’s graduation speech to Tulane Law School).
37. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rules 1.2, 1.6, 3.3, 4.1 (1995) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
38. See, e.g., Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies and
Techniques, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7, 13 (1996) (providing a grid for categorizing types
of mediation).
39. For example, Judith Maute has argued that mediators should bear greater ethical re-
sponsibility when they “preside” over cases where parties are not represented. See  Judith
Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS  503, 508 (1991).
40. See  Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982)
(discussing the role lawyers might play in negotiations concerning administrative procedure);
see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State , 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1997).
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ance, racial tensions, police accountability and reorganizations of human
services agencies, new kinds of processes, variously called “consensus
building,”41 strategic planning, joint problem solving, community educa-
tion,42 public conversations43 and meeting facilitation,44 have been used
by lawyers and others to facilitate new forms of problem solving with
multiple parties and interested stakeholders. These new processes may
very well need new kinds of rules or expectations about their own ethics
and professionalism, where service is to groups of people who are not
“clients” in the strictly legal or adversarial sense. Duties to explain the
legal significance of these processes clearly, to treat confidentiality dif-
ferently, to be accountable to various affected parties,45 and to be neutral
and unbiased may take on different meanings in these new contexts.
Even within more traditional lawyer roles, the current rules must re-
spond to the many ways in which lawyers are intersecting with less con-
ventional forms of legal process. Some states have already recognized
the new ethical obligation of the lawyer to advise and counsel the client
about other means for resolving problems beyond the obvious choice of
litigation. Colorado and Georgia, for example, have required lawyers to
discuss alternative processes with clients,46 and now, many courts, espe-
cially those with mandatory ADR programs, may require such counsel-
ing as a matter of procedural, rather than ethical mandates. If the law-
yer’s responsibilities are to help clients, and possibly others, achieve
their legitimate ends, then advice about the most effective and efficient
way to achieve those goals would seem to be an obvious and integral part
of the lawyer’s obligations.
To the extent that lawyers may interact more directly, either with rep-
resented, or even with unrepresented parties,47 what obligations ought
lawyers to have in dealing directly with parties who are not their own cli-
ents?48
                                                                                                                                                
41. See, e.g., CONSENSUS BUILDING H ANDBOOK, supra note 8.
42. See  Ingrid Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services
Practice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 433 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Symposium, Innovations in Process: New Applications for ADR, DISP.
RESOL. M AG., Winter 1997, at 1.
44. See  ROGER SCHWARZ, THE SKILLED FACILITATOR: PRACTICAL WISDOM FOR DEVELOPING
EFFECTIVE GROUPS  (1994).
45. See, e.g., Larry Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem,
6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981). But see Joseph Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Media tion: A Reply
to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981).
46. See, e.g., COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1992); GA. R. CIV. P.
Rule EC7-5; see also  Art Garwin, Show Me the Offer, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 84; Mich. State
Bar Comm. on Prof. and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. RI-255 & RI-262; Kansas Bar Assoc.
Comm. on Ethics-Advisory Services, Op. 94-01; Pennsylvania Bar Assoc. Eth ics, Op. 90-125.
47. See  Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Law -
yers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF . L. R EV. 79, 81-82 (1997) (ar-
gu ing that more enforcement and clarification of Model Rule 4.3 and Model Rule DR 7-
104(A)(2) is needed when lawyers act adversarily with those who are unrepresented and cannot
protect themselves).
48. A growing body of law is taking on the question of what responsibilities and liabilities
lawyers may have to third parties who are not their clients, but who may rely on their work or
representations. See, e.g., Symposium, The Lawyer’s Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties, 37
S. TEX. L. REV. 957 (1996).
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In exploring the lawyer’s role as “peacemaker,” my principal concern
here, I want to focus on the role that lawyers play when they assist par-
ties in resolving disputes outside of court or utilize new forms of appro-
priate dispute resolution, even in transactional work, or “transactional
ADR,” as I have come to call it. Our conventional rules of ethics are par-
ticularly inapposite when lawyers serve in quasi-judicial roles as arbi-
trators,49 or as mediators, facilitating negotiations among and between
parties, but not deciding anything. Third party neutrals, like mediators
and consensus-building facilitators, seldom decide cases or “find” facts.
Such people are trained to probe for parties’ underlying needs and inter-
ests and to focus on commonalities as well as differences. Rather than
focusing on aggressive persuasiveness, third party neutrals ask parties
and their lawyers to use creativity, patience, persistence, flexibility and
resilience, without rigid or premature closure on a problem. Some proc-
esses are particular to the forms—caucuses and other separate meetings
with parties and stakeholders look like ex parte contacts, which would
ordinarily be prohibited by traditional rules of legal ethics, but, in these
contexts, separate meetings are often contracted for, though perhaps still
require some ethical regulation 50 like requiring disclosure of practices
and clarity regarding confidentiality obligations.51
Many mediators and facilitators seek to involve all “stakeholders,”
like insurers or relevant community members, even when they are not
formally part of a lawsuit, thus complicating the layers of involvement
lawyers may have with different participants. Mediation and other less
adversarial problem-solving techniques produce different outcomes. For
example, the outcomes may be provisional and dynamic, rather than de-
cided and static and may require continuous monitoring and continuing
relations with the parties.
Lawyers also perform different functions as “representatives” in these
other processes. Several commentators have suggested that because law-
yers’ roles in these settings are so different, these alternative techniques
require new rules and different terminology. 52 In part, because of the in-
                                                                                                                                                
49. Many think that the Judicial Code of Conduct can be used as a benchmark for ethical
standards and professionalism in situations where lawyers play adjudicative roles. I do not
agree, since the judge has a permanent role, which allows him to be at arms length from parties
on a regular basis. Arbitrators who may depend on parties choosing and paying them may be
closer to lawyers seeking clients in some respects, while resembling judges in others. The
American Arbitration Association has promulgated several ethics codes for arbitrators, taking
account of the different subject matters in which they operate. See, e.g.,  ETHICAL RULES FOR
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS  (1977) (now under revision); ETHICAL RULES FOR LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATORS .
50. See  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks with Neutrals: ADR Hazards , 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG . 109 (1994).
51. Some sophisticated states now statutorily regulate matters like confidentiality in me-
diation. See  NANCY ROGERS & CRAIG MCEWEN, M EDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE (2d ed.
1994). The current draft of a proposed Uniform Mediation Act being considered by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws deals with some of these issues as sub-
stantive regulatory matters. See  Richard C. Reuben & Nancy Rogers, Uniform Mediation Act
Goes Public for Comments, DISP. RESOL. M AG., Summer 1999, at 18-19.
52. See, e.g. , Roger Fisher, What about Negotiation as a Specialty?, 69 A.B.A. J.  1221
(1983) (advocating negotiation as specialization, apart from strategical litigation techniques);
Robert W. Rack, Jr. Settle or Withdraw: Collaborative Lawyering Provides Incen tives to
Avoid Costly Litigation, DISP. RESOL. M AG., Summer 1998, at 8 (discussing a new trend toward
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creased use of “warmer”53 dispute resolution techniques, we are begin-
ning to reexamine what the appropriate level of candor should be be-
tween lawyers in both private negotiation settings and in certain ADR
settings.54 If the ethical reference point is “solving the problem”, “doing
justice” or even “achieving Pareto optimal solutions” rather than win-
ning, zeal, or the “adversary system excuse,” then we will have to con-
sider the opposing side more as a “joint venturer” than an adversary.
Furthermore, we may be in many settings where there is no adversary at
all, or where adversarialism may shift from time to time, in all its post-
modern glory, with coalitions concentrating on different issues within a
transaction or dispute.55 Lawyers would be called on to facilitate, create
and synthesize, as well as to analyze, argue and criticize. Learning to
“think out of the box” and be creative about solutions would be contra-
dictory to the conventional lawyer’s approach—simply looking for the
best precedent.
As these new roles for lawyers proliferate, new ethical issues arise for
which there are no clear answers. Some suggest it is too early to crystal-
lize these new forms of practice and rigidify them with rules or regula-
tions, or use professional regulation to act as a gatekeeper to a new pro-
fession with many possible disciplinary homes. While I am sympathetic
to these arguments and have long supported flexibility in developing
these creative approaches to problem solving, we simply cannot ignore
the numerous professionalism issues surrounding this new area of prac-
tice.
First, a lawyer engaging in these kinds of non- or less- adversarial
situations56 is still disciplinable as a lawyer for the things she does in any
                                                                                                                                                
“collaborative lawyering” in which lawyers and clients enter contractual agreements to “negoti-
ate in good faith until an agreement is found”).
53. David Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J.
COMP . L. 205 (1978).
54. See  Philip Schrag & Lisa Lerman, Testimony Before Ethics Commission 2000, (June
4, 1999). In the last attempt to change the ethics rules, there were proposals to make candor a
process requirement of negotiation and “conscionability” a substantive requirement. See
MODEL RULES Rules 4.2, 4.3 (Discussion Draft 1983). In this era scholars debated whether can -
dor and a standard of preventing “unconscionability” in lawyer-assisted negotiations were en -
forceable in arenas of totally private behavior. See  Murray Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL L. REV. 669, 682-83 (1978); see also  James J. White, Ma-
chiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotia tions , 1980 AM . B. FOUND RES. J.
926, 927-28 (arguing that ethical norms may be violated more readily in negotiation setting be-
cause of the private nature of the parties’ interactions). For a more modern view of the self-
enforcing market in reputational ethics see Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic
of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 501 (1989) (arguing that a “functionalist” approach to bar-
gaining produces ethical behavior by making negotiation reputation more public).
55. See  Gary Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 243, 250 (1994) (“Coalition formation occurs when parties negotiate an alliance
agreement, formally or informally, expressly or tacitly.”).
56. One must remember that many of these alternative processes have their adversarial
components. Presentations by representatives in arbitration are as adversary as any activity
that lawyers engage in, and even mediation presentations have become increasingly adversa r-
ial, opportunistic and gaming over time as experienced lawyer-advocates become party repre-
sentatives and mediators. See  Gail Cox, Arbitration is No Simple Matter, NAT’L L.J. , June 28,
1999, at A1; BENNETT PICKER, MEDIATION PRACTICE GUIDE; A HANDBOOK FOR RESOLVING
BUSINESS DISPUTES (1998) (providing guidance to practitioners in an increasingly more formal
area of legal work); CPR I NSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, M EDIATOR’S DESKBOOK (K. Scan -
lon ed., 1999) (same).
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setting if the conduct violates the applicable lawyer disciplinary rules.57
Besides lawyer ethics codes, there are pesky questions of potential legal
malpractice liability. So far, I am not aware of any reported case in which
a lawyer has been held liable for mediator malpractice; however, I have
heard of unreported settlements. Liability coverage is now being under-
written for mediator malpractice, and there are reported cases of unsuc-
cessful efforts to hold lawyers liable for their actions as third party neu-
trals.58
The proliferation of ethics codes and standards by a variety of third
party neutral professional associations59 makes clear that those who
practice these forms of problem solving, professional facilitation, and
“neutraling” see a need to professionalize by having standards and ex-
erting some form of quality control over those who perform such serv-
ices. Though such efforts are often criticized as market control projects,
most of these organizations have active ethics committees that hear
complaints from consumers and also attempt to develop “best practices”
standards.
Furthermore, ADR practi tioners are actively seeking ethical guidance
when faced with the complex ethical issues confronting third party neu-
trals, parties themselves and their representatives in these processes. I
have canvassed most of these issues at length elsewhere, 60 but they in-
clude such formal, rule-based issues as conflicts of interests,61 fees,62
confidentiality and disclosures of harm, 63 neutrality and impartiality,
competence, aiding unauthorized practice and relevant duties of candor
and disclosure, as well as good faith participation in both private (con-
tractual) and public (court-sponsored or ordered) proceedings. 64 And, if
                                                                                                                                                
57. Such rules might include confidentiality rules, contacts with unrepresented parties,
fees, advertising, and practicing with nonlawyers or others.
58. See  Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. App. 1981) (involving an attempt to sue
mediator for malpractice); see also Wagshall v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (in -
volving suit against mediator and holding that while acting as court-appointed mediator and
performing within the scope of duty, mediators enjoy immunity from damages); Howard v.
Drapkin, 222 Cal. App. 3d 843, 848 (1990); Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
812 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1987). See generally Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A
New Role for Fiduciary Duties, 53 U. CIN . L. REV. 731 (1984) (discussing several theories of l i-
ability and advocating a “fiduciary duties approach” to address mediator misconduct).
59. For example, the American Arbitration Association, the Academy of Family Mediators,
and the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution are such associations.
60. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1;
Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restatment; see also  Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas of Media -
tion Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (1994),
reprinted in DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES 385 (1996); Leonard L. Riskin, To-
ward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIZ. L. R EV. 329, 329-30
(1984) (proposing new standards and ethical obligations for mediators).
61. Examples of conflicts of interest include those that lawyer-mediators have with cur-
rent, past or potential future representational clients, as well as past, present or poten tial future
mediation clients, and conflicts that lawyer-mediators have with imputation of their conflicts to
other members of their firm.
62. ADR practitioners face questions regarding the ethics of contingent fees and fee-
splitting with nonlawyers.
63. See  Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345-49 (1976) (applying duty of
psychologists to disclose “confidential” facts about a patient to prevent harm to a third party).
64. See  Edward Sherman, Court Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Forms
of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2089 (1993) (discussing the “five
frequently encountered forms of participation that may be required to comply with court-
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a lawyer has a duty to correct a fraud on the court under Model Rule 3.3,
should a mediator have to correct known perjurious or fraudulent testi-
mony in a later proceeding on the same matter if the mediator knows the
information is false?65
Beyond the more formalistic ethical dilemmas are other practice is-
sues such as what the mediator should do when she knows one side is
misrepresenting facts or law to the other side or to the mediator; what
authority a mediator or other third party neutral has to order disclosure
of information, and how information should be treated when it is not
otherwise discoverable (what I have called proprietary “settlement
facts”); what is appropriate for the mediator to do when there are re-
source or other power differentials between the parties; what role should
the mediator play in designing, transmitting and formalizing offers, so-
lutions and agreement drafting; what accountability should the mediator
feel for whatever agreement or solution she presides over?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, parties to these new non-
adversarial processes need some understanding of what the ground rules
are, where they can go to complain about perceived unfair or corrupt
processes, and what relation these processes have to more formal legal
processes. To the extent that legal ethics rules have been justified by ref-
erence to professional function or legal institutions, these newer, less
adversarial processes must develop their animating rationales and just i-
fications to gain acceptability and legitimacy. If non-adversarial proc-
esses are to offer better ways of solving human and legal problems, then
they must be able to demonstrate that they have coherent ethics and
standards of quality and professionalism to those who would use these
services. While many argue that the market will adequately control and
police here,66 a new field, coupled with the complications of multiple dis-
ciplinary roots, presents enormous information asymmetries to would-
be users. To that end, ethicists in these fields are now engaged in the
complicated work of developing best practices and both aspirational and
positivistic ethical codes.
I want to close with a classic dilemma in legal ethics, one that has
been revisited every time we draft new rules of ethics: Should our ethics
codes be aspirational, seeking to express best practices and suggested
goals for how we can best do our work and often expressed in grandiose,
if inspirational, language? Or, do we need to regulate for Holmes’
bad(man) professional?67 Must we make rules clear and draft with an eye
                                                                                                                                                
ordered ADR: good faith participation; exchange of position papers and objective information;
minimum meaningful participation; participation with settlement authority; and obligation to
pay the third-party neutral’s fee”).
65. Clearly no current rule or legal standard requires such an undertaking, but courts are
beginning to subpoena mediators to testify about a variety of matters involving their work. See,
e.g., Carmen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794-95 (8th Cir. 1997) (hold ing that
employee communications to a mediator were not protected from discovery by an ombudsman
privilege). But see  Reginald Alleyne, Mediator Immunity, CHRON. J. OF NAT’L ACAD. OF ARB.,
Mar. 1989, 1 (mediator suggesting he will refuse to testify in order to protect confiden tiality as
duty of mediator).
66.  See, e.g., Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra note 4.
67. See  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES , J R., THE PATH OF THE LAW (1968).
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toward the lawyer who will use the rules in the most technocratic way68
to avoid them and seek self-interest wherever possible?
I leave you with two different formulations, which I have worked on
over the past few years. First is an aspirational code expressing the ten
most important responsibilities that I think lawyers should undertake
when acting in these new capacities. Second, appended to this essay is a
detailed and complex ethical rule, currently under submission to the
ABA’s Ethics Commission 2000 on the possible revision of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and to the many states enacting ethical
rules for third party neutrals.69 I welcome comments and reactions to
these formulations. What I most wish to express, however, is that al-
though the ethical issues are difficult and the analogies to the lawyer’s
role as adversary or advocate will not take us very far to resolve these
problems, I do not want the complexity of the ethical issues to prevent
lawyers from engaging in these new roles; they are difficult and unfa-
miliar to those with conventional legal educations.70 These new roles are
our future—in our ability to find new ways to solve problems and meet
human needs—and these, it seems to me, are appropriate goals for our
profession and our human ethics.
II.   THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION : AN
ASPIRATIONAL CODE71
1. Lawyers should have an obligation to consider and inform the
client about the possible methods of resolving a dispute, planning a
transaction, or participating in legislative, administrative or other proc-
esses that might best address the client’s needs. Lawyers should educate
themselves and their clients about all available options for handling the
client’s matter.
2. Lawyers should promptly communicate all proposals to re-
solve disputes by any process suggested by other parties, clients or deci-
sion-makers.
3. Lawyers should consider and promptly communicate all sub-
stantive proposals for dispute resolution or transactional agreements to
their clients, including both legally based remedies and resolutions and
                                                                                                                                                
68. See  Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Delib-
erators?, 69 S. CAL. L. R EV. 885, 885 (1996) (contrasting “technocratic” rule manipulation of
ethics rules with more discretionary and “sentimentally relevant ethical deliberation).
69. This proposed Rule applies to lawyers acting as third party neutrals only—not to oth -
ers who may also engage in these activities.
70. Currently, several projects are underway to attempt to introduce more conflict resolu -
tion and problem solving in legal education including the CPR Commission on Legal Education
and Problem Solving, funded by the Open Society Institute; the Missouri-Columbia curriculum
integration and dissemination project, funded by FIPSE; and an in terdisciplinary seminar on
conflict resolution in the law school curriculum at Stanford, funded by the Hewlett Foundation.
As with all attempts to change legal education, only outside funding seems to motivate legal
educators to look at new subject matter and new pedagogy, but that is a subject for another day!
71. These aspirational standards were developed through my work with the ABA Section
on Dispute Resolution, Ethics Sub-Committee; the Committee has not endorsed these or any
other formal formulations of ethics rules for the non-adversarial lawyer. The full section of Dis-
pute Resolution endorsed another set of standards, but these standards have never been ap -
proved by the ABA’s House of Delegates. See  ABA/AAA/SPIDR, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS (1994).
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those that address other needs or interests. Lawyers should assist clients
to consider non-legal concerns including social, ethical, economic, psy-
chological and moral implications of any possible solutions or proposals.
4. Lawyers should not misrepresent to or conceal from another
person, a relevant fact or legal principle (including opposing counsel,
parties, judicial officers, third party neutrals or other individuals who
might rely on such statements).
5. Lawyers should not intentionally or recklessly deceive another
or refuse to answer material and relevant questions in representing cli-
ents.
6. Lawyers as representatives should not agree to a resolution of
a problem or participation in a transaction that they have reason to
know will cause substantial injustice to the other party. In essence, a
lawyer should do no harm.
7. A lawyer serving as a third party neutral should decline to ap-
prove or otherwise sanction an agreement achieved by parties which the
third party neutral has reason to know would effect an injustice on a
party (or third party).
8. Lawyers serving as third party neutrals, such as arbitrators
and mediators, should disclose all reasons the parties might consider
relevant in determining if the neutrals have any bias, prejudice or basis
for not acting fairly and without improper interest in a matter.
9. Lawyers serving as client representatives or as third party
neutrals should fully explain to their clients and parties any and all proc-
esses and procedures that will be used to facilitate solutions, make
claims, or plan transactions so parties can understand and participate in
the decision about what procedures to use.
10. Lawyers should treat all parties to a legal matter as they
would wish to be treated themselves and should consider the effects of
what they accomplish for their clients. In essence, lawyers should respect
a lawyers’ golden rule.72
                                                                                                                                                
72. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Pater-
nalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. R EV. 761, 764 (dis-
cussing the Golden Rule and its application in the lawyering context) (1990); see also Leslie
Griffin, Whose Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties?, 37 S. TEX. L. R EV. 1191, 1191 (1996) (ar-
guing that lawyers should be treated as all others in the professional liability context for liability
to third parties).
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III. PROPOSED MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE LAWYER
AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL73
The Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, sponsored by
Georgetown University and CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution has
drafted this proposed Model Rule for adoption into the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.74 We offer here a framework or architecture for
consideration by the appropriate bodies of the American Bar Association
and any state agency or legislature charged with drafting lawyer ethics
rules.75
The proposed Model Rule addresses the ethical responsibilities of
lawyers serving as third party neutrals in a variety of ADR fora (arbitra-
tion, mediation, early neutral evaluation, etc.). As an initial jurisdictional
matter, the proposed Rule does not address the ethical requirements of
nonlawyers performing these duties76 or the ethical duties of lawyers
acting in ADR proceedings as representatives or advocates.77
                                                                                                                                                
73. The Model Rule of Professional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral has
been prepared by the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, spon-
sored by CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution and Georgetown University Law Cen ter, with
support from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. The rule’s reporters i nclude Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University and Chair, CPR-Georgetown Com-
mission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, and Elizabeth Plapinger, Vice President, CPR and
Staff Director, CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR.
The Rule’s drafters are members of the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Stan -
dards in ADR Drafting Committee. The committee is part of the CPR-Georgetown Commis-
sion’s Working Group on ADR and Law Practice. The Drafting Committee includes the Honor-
able Jerome Simandle, the Honorable Edmund Spaeth, John Bickerman, Esq., Lawrence Fox,
Esq., Duane Krohnke, Esq., Bruce Meyerson, Esq., Professor Nancy Rogers, Elizabeth Plap -
inger, Esq. and Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow. Professor Geoffrey Hazard served as a con -
sultant and commentator for the group.
74. Earlier efforts have produced suggestions for additions to the Model Rules regard ing
ADR. See, e.g., Judith Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case For Mediator Ac-
countability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS  503 (1991) (suggesting reform in the mediation con text);
Robert A. Baruch-Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas
and Policy Implications, 1 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (1994) (reviewing ethical issues facing media-
tors). The CPR-Georgetown effort attempts to remedy some of the inadequacies of transdisci-
plinary ethical code drafting as well as the silences of current legal ethics formulations. See,
e.g., AAA/ABA/SPIDR MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (adopted in 1994 but
not ratified to date by the ABA Board of Governors); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS  631 (1997) (discussing the forthcoming Restatement of Laws Governing
Lawyers’ failing attempt at dealing with ethical issues raised by ADR practice).
75. The proposed Rule is in progress and the Drafting Committee welcomes all comments
to Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow at Georgetown University Law Center, 600 New Jersey
Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001 (meadow@law.georgetown.edu) or Elizabeth Plapinger,
Vice President, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, 366 Madison Avenue, New York, New
York 10017 (eplapinger@cpradr.org).
76. The proposed Rule is designed for incorporation into lawyer ethical codes. The ques-
tion of what other agencies may promulgate transdisciplinary rules—such as the
AAA/ABA/SPIDR Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators , or state statutes governing all
mediators, for example—is not addressed.
77. This rule attempts to regulate solely the ethical responsibilities of lawyers serving as
neutrals and does not deal with other issues such as the potentially different duties of lawyers
as representatives or advocates within ADR settings. See  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Me-
diation Representation: A Road Map of Critical Issues, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 3
(discussing whether a different set of ethical rules for lawyers involved in the mediation con text
is necessary and desirable).
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RULE 4.5 THE LAWYER AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL78
A.   Preamble
As client representatives, public citizens and professionals commit-
ted to justice and fair and efficient legal process, lawyers should help cli-
ents, and others needing legal assistance, pursue the most effective
resolution of legal problems. This obligation should include pursuing
methods and outcomes that cause the least harm to all parties, that re-
solve matters amicably where possible, and that promote harmonious
relations. Modern lawyers serve these values of justice, fairness, effi-
ciency and harmony as partisan representatives and as third party neu-
trals.
This Rule applies to the lawyer who acts as a third party neutral to
help represented or unrepresented parties resolve disputes or arrange
transactions among each other. When lawyers act in neutral, non-
representative capacities, they have different duties and obligations in
the areas addressed by this Rule than lawyers acting in a representative
capacity. The current Model Rules are silent on lawyer roles as third
party neutrals, which are different from the representational functions
addressed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and judicial
functions governed by the Judicial Code of Conduct .79
Contemporary law practice involves lawyers in a variety of new roles
within the traditional boundaries of counselors, advocates and advisors
in the legal system. Now lawyers commonly serve as third party neutrals,
either as facilitators to settle disputes or plan transactions, as in media-
tion, or as third party decision-makers, as in arbitration. Such proceed-
ings, including mediation, arbitration and other hybrid forms of settle-
ment or decision making, occur both as adjuncts to the litigation proc-
ess—either through a court referral or court-based program, or by an
agreement between the parties—and outside litigation via private
agreement. These proceedings are commonly known as “ADR” proc-
esses.80 Some state ethics codes, statutes or court rules now require or
                                                                                                                                                
78. The proposed Rule is numbered Rule 4.5 (contemplating an addition to the Model
Rules section on “Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients,” in simple numerical o rder).
Ideally, “The Lawyer as Third Party Neutral” would be a new Rule 4, renumerating cu rrent
rules.
Where possible, we use language, definitions, standards and formulations consistent with the
current Model Rules. We also take note, where pertinent, of the ongoing work of the Ethics
2000 Commission of the American Bar Association, which is proposing revisions to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers, ratified by the American Law Institute in May 1999.
79. See  Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra  note 1, at 430
(indicating the different “foundational principles” in non-adversarial practice, such as joint gain
over individual gain, “future orientation” rather than “past orientation,” thus illu strating a need
for a separate regulatory scheme).
80. The term “ADR” is used here to connote “appropriate dispute resolution,” suggesting a
choice of methods to be used to fit the matter. In more common parlance, ADR is used to con -
note “alternative dispute resolution” processes, which are seen as alternatives to more conven-
tional trial or litigation methods.
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strongly suggest that lawyers have a duty to counsel their clients re-
garding ADR means.81
When lawyers serve as ADR neutrals they do not have partisan cli-
ents, as contemplated in much of the Model Rules; rather, they serve all
of the parties. Lawyer neutrals do not represent parties, but they have a
duty to be fair to all participants in the process and to fufill different ob-
ligations and responsibilities with respect to the parties and process.82
Nor do the rules that apply to judges, such as the Judicial Code of Con-
duct, adequately deal with many issues confronting lawyer neutrals. For
example, lawyers who act as third party neutrals in one case may serve
as representational counsel in other matters and, thus, confront special
conflicts of interest, appearance of impropriety, and confidentiality is-
sues as they switch roles.83 Unlike the judge or arbitrator who remains at
arms length from the parties and who usually hears information usually
only when both parties are present, mediators have different ethical is-
sues to contend with as they hear private, proprietary facts from both
sides, in caucuses and ex parte communications. 84
While there continues to be some controversy about whether serving
as a mediator or arbitrator is the practice of law or may be covered by
the ancillary practice Rule 5.7,85 it is clear that lawyers serving as third
                                                                                                                                                
81. See, e.g., Marshall Breger, Should an Attorney be Required to Advise a Client on ADR
Options? (discussion paper prepared for the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution and distributed
at ABA Annual Meeting (1998)) (including listing of relevant statutes, court rules and ethical
provisions); COLORADO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1; GEORGIA RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE  EC 7-5 (1996).
82. While the third party neutral does not represent or advocate for any of the parties to
an ADR proceeding, in some circumstances, the third party neutral may provide info rmation or
advice to the parties without establishing a representational relationship. See  infra, notes 85
and 86 and accompanying text.
83. See  Poly Software Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995) (hold ing
that if a mediator hears confidential information through the course of a mediation, he may not
represent a party in the same matter or one of substantial relation unless all parties to the me-
diation proceedings consent after disclosure).
84.  See  Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 863-64 (1995) (holding that a law
firm must be disqualified from a proceeding after hiring “the retired judge who had presided
over the action and had received ex parte confidences from the opposing party in the course of
settlement proceedings”). The Judicial Code of Conduct may also need revision to address new
judicial roles in ADR, such as referral to ADR processes, ex parte communications with parties
and third party neutrals, as well as judicial roles in settlement conferences. See  Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks with Neutrals: ADR Hazards, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 109, 109 (1994); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Judicial Referral to ADR: Issues &
Problems Faced by Judges, 7 F.J.C. DIRECTIONS 8, 8 (1994).
85. In 1994, Professor Geoffrey Hazard opined that activities in ADR can be considered
“ancillary” functions of the lawyer, under current Rule 5.7, making the Model Rules applicable
to lawyers serving in ADR situations. See  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When ADR is Ancillary to a
Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflicts Issues, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 147, 147 (1994). The Commission believes that subsequent analysis and case law support
the need for the new rule proposed here. See  Cho , 45 Cal. Rptr. at 863;  see also Poly Software
Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1490-91 (D. Utah 1995); Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alter -
native Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at 407; Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restatement,
supra note 1, at 631.
For commentary on the debate over whether mediation constitutes the practice of law, see
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 57 (1996); Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate are Not Practicing Law, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG . 74 (1996); Symposium, Is Mediation the Practice of Law,
NIDR Forum, June 1997; Geetha Ravindra, When Mediation Becomes the Unauthorized Prac-
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party neutrals need ethical guidance from the Model Rules with respect
to their dual roles as partisan representatives and as neutrals. The draft-
ers believe it is especially important to develop clear ethical rules when
the lawyer, commonly conceived of as a partisan representative, takes on
the different role of neutral problem solver, facilitator or decision maker.
Lawyers may be disciplined for any violation of the Model Rules or
misconduct, regardless of whether they are formally found to be serving
in lawyer-like roles. Accordingly, while other associations provide guid-
ance within specific contexts,86 when lawyers serve as mediators or arbi-
trators, their ethical duties and discipline under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct may be implicated. For these reasons, this pro-
posed Rule is submitted to provide guidance for lawyers who serve as
third party neutrals and to advise judicial officers and state discipline
counsel who enforce lawyer ethical or disciplinary standards. 87
B.   Scope of the Proposed Model Rule
The proposed Model Rule is drafted to govern lawyers serving in the
full array of ADR neutral roles: as arbitrators, mediators, evaluators, and
in other hybrid processes. The Drafting Committee believes that a gen-
eral rule governing lawyers, serving in all third party neutral roles is ap-
propriate because the proposed Rule addresses core ethical duties that
apply to virtually all neutral roles. Where different neutral roles give rise
to different duties and obligations, the proposed Rule so provides in text
or comment.88 A single rule is also consistent with the generally trans-
substantive approach of the Model Rules. As the Model Rules recognize
increasing diversity of lawyer roles, separate rules for lawyers as media-
tors or arbitrators may be appropriate in the future.89
The proposed Rule applies only to lawyers serving as third party
neutrals.90 Many other professionals now serve as arbitrators, mediators,
conciliators, evaluators or ombuds, and other bodies have promulgated
transdisciplinary ethical rules relating to those services.91 When a lawyer
                                                                                                                                                
tice of Law, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG . 94 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To the
Editors: Is Mediation the Practice of Law? Redux, NIDR News, Nov.-Dec. 1997, Jan. 1998, at
2.
86. See, e.g., AAA/ABA, THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
(1977).
87. Whether third party neutrals will be liable in malpractice or on other legal
theories to parties to an ADR is a question of state law.
88. In facilitating dispute resolution and planning transactions, in a variety of ways, neu -
trals may have different obligations with respect to various issues and within various contexts.
For example, where ex parte or caucus sessions are used, different issues surrounding confi-
dentiality may arise. Further, multiple use of a single neutral by one party may raise conflict of
interest questions, depending on the neutral’s role, the parties’ agreement and the relevant ju -
risdictional regulations. See  infra proposed Rule 4.5.4.
89. See  MODEL RULES Rules 1.13 (Organization as Client), 2.1 (Lawyer as Advisor), 3.8,
(Special Responsibilities of Lawyer as Prosecutor).
90. Also, the proposed Rule mainly governs issues of individual, ethical responsibility
rather than organizational duties. However, with respect to conflicts of interest, both ind ividual
and organizational responsibilities are stated in the “imputation and screening” rule. See infra
proposed Rule 4.5.4(b).
91. See, e.g., ABA/AAA/SPIDR MODEL STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS (1994); SPIDR,
ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN
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serves as a third party neutral in a capacity governed by multiple sets of
ethical standards, the lawyer must note that the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct  govern his/her duties as a lawyer neutral, and will gov-
ern the discipline of a third party neutral who is a lawyer.92 The proposed
Rule does not govern lawyers in their capacities as representatives or ad-
vocates within ADR proceedings. When a lawyer serves as an advocate,
representative or counselor to a party in an ADR proceeding, he or she is
governed by such other rules as are applicable to lawyer conduct, either
before tribunals93 or in relation to all other third parties.94
The proposed Rule, where possible, uses the same language and defi-
nitions of other lawyer and judicial standards, including formulations
from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct , the Judicial Code of
Conduct, the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes,95
and the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.96 As
the preamble to the Model Rules states, these rules are not to be used as
liability standards for malpractice or other purposes. On the other hand,
the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes
                                                                                                                                                
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1986); ACADEMY OF FAMILY MEDIATORS, MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (1984).
92. This Rule distinguishes the lawyer’s role as a neutral from the lawyer who may serve
as an “intermediary” under Model Rule 2.2 and who therefore, “represents” several clients in an
“intermediation” of their relationship such as a partnership, joint ven ture, or in some cases, d i-
vorce proceedings. The American Bar Association’s Ethics 2000 Commission is currently re-
viewing the Model Rules and developing proposals for revision. A current Ethics Commission
proposal calls for the elimination of Model Rule 2.2.
93. See  MODEL RULES Rule 3.3.
94. See  MODEL RULES Rule 4.1. A joint initiative of the CPR-Georgetown Commission and
the ABA Dispute Resolution Section Ethics Committee is proposing amendments to the text
and comments of existing Model Rules to address these issues. Among the issues being ad -
dressed by the Joint Initiative is the mean ing and scope of the term “tribunal” in the Model
Rules. The term “tribunal” in the Model Rules has been inte rpreted to apply to adjudicative or
trial-type hearings, thereby arguably excluding facilit ative-type processes. The Joint Initiative
drafters believe that the term should be clarified to include ADR proceedings which are not
adjudicative but held pursuant to court rules and regulations, whether proceedings are held
within the courthouse or not.
The Joint Initiative, the Ethics 2000 Commission, and other groups are also considering cur-
rent proposals to redraft Model Rules 3.3 and 4.1 to include increased duties of candor to tribu -
nals, to clients and other third parties (such as in the rectification of fraud). In addition, rules
that apply to the lawyer’s role as counselor, Rules 2.1-2.3, for example, and general rules of law-
yer-client relations, such as confidentiality, Model Rule 1.6, might also need to be supple-
mented or amended to address different ethical responsibilities in different settings. See, e.g.,
Ethics 2000 Commission Rules 1.6, 3.3. Some have also suggested that the candor and good
faith participation duties be heightened in some forms of ADR proceedings. See, e.g., Kimberlee
K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics in Mediation: Time for a Requirement of Good Faith, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Winter 1997, at 9 (“The rules and guidelines appropriate for an adversarial, third party
determined outcome, are, at best, inapplicable to a participatory, interest-based mutual prob-
lem-solving process.”).
95. AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1997); These
rules are currently being revised by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators
in Commercial Disputes Convened by the Arbitration Committee, Section on Dispute Resolu -
tion, American Bar Association.
96. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers was ratified by the American Law
Institute in May 1999. For commentary on the Restatement’s failure to address lawyering is-
sues raised by ADR practice, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement, su -
pra note 1; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Non-Silences of Professor Hazard on “The S ilences of the
Restatement”: A Response to Professor Menkel-Meadow , 10 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS  671
(1997).
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that ethical rules and standards are often used for civil liability, as well
as for discipline, and this proposed Rule has been drafted accordingly.
C.   Definitions
This Rule is intended to be applied to the duties and responsibil ities
of lawyers who act as third party neutrals in the following processes:
1.   Adjudicative
Arbitration - A procedure in which each party presents its position
and evidence before a single, neutral third party or a panel, who is em-
powered to render a resolution of the matter between the parties. Arbi-
trators may be chosen jointly by all parties, by contractual arrangements,
under court or other rules, and, in some cases, may be chosen specifi-
cally by each side. Arbitrators chosen separately by each party to a dis-
pute may be considered “partisan” arbitrators or “neutral” arbitrators,
depending on the rules governing the arbitration. If the parties agree in
advance or applicable law provides, the award is binding and enforceable
in the same manner as any contractual obligation or under applicable
statute (such as the Federal Arbitration Act or state equivalents).
Agreements by the parties or applicable law may provide rules for
whether the award must be in writing and what recourse the parties may
have when the arbitration is not binding.
2.   Evaluative
Neutral Evaluation - A procedure in which a third party neutral pro-
vides an assessment of the positions of the parties. In a neutral evalua-
tion process, lawyers and/or parties present summaries of the facts, evi-
dence, and legal principles applicable to their cases to a single neutral or
a panel of neutral evaluators who then provide(s) an assessment of the
strengths, weaknesses, and potential value of the case to all sides. By
agreement of the parties or by applicable law, such evaluations are usu-
ally non-binding and offered to facilitate settlement. By agreement of the
parties or by applicable law or practice, if the matter does not reach a
settlement, the neutral evaluator may also provide other services such as
case-planning guidance, discovery scheduling, or other settlement as-
sistance. By agreement of the parties or applicable law, the neutral
evaluator(s) may issue fact-finding, discovery, and other reports or rec-
ommendations.
Mediation - A procedure in which a third party neutral facilitates
communications and negotiations among the parties to effect resolution
of the matter by agreement of the parties. In some forms of mediation
the third party neutral may engage in evaluative tasks, such as providing
legal information, helping parties and their counsel assess likely out-
comes, and inquiring into the legal and factual strengths and weaknesses
of the problems presented. By agreement of the parties or applicable law,
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mediators may sometimes be called on to act as evaluators or special
discovery masters, or to perform other third party neutral roles.
3.   Facilitative
Mediation - A procedure in which a third party neutral facilitates
communication and negotiations among the parties to seek resolution of
issues between the parties. Mediation is non-binding and does not, un-
less otherwise agreed to by the parties, authorize the third party neutral
to evaluate (see above), decide or otherwise offer a judgment on the is-
sues between the parties. If the mediation concludes in an agreement,
that agreement, if it meets otherwise applicable law concerning the en-
forceability of contracts, is enforceable as a contractual agreement.
Where authorized by applicable law, mediation agreements achieved
during pending litigation may be entered as court judgments.
4.   Hybrid Processes
Minitrial - A procedure in which parties and their counsel present
their matter, which may include evidence, legal arguments, documents
and other summaries of their case, before a neutral third party and rep-
resentatives of all parties, for the purpose of defining issues, pursuing
settlement negotiations, or otherwise sharing information. A neutral
third party, usually at the parties’ request, may issue an advisory opin-
ion, which is non-binding unless the parties agree otherwise.
Med-arb - A procedure in which the parties initially seek mediation
of their dispute before a third party neutral, but, if they reach impasse,
may convert the proceeding into an arbitration in which the third party
neutral renders an award. This process may also occur in reverse, in
which, during a contested arbitration proceeding, the parties may agree
to seek facilitation of a settlement (mediation) from the third party neu-
tral. In some cases, these third party neutral functions may be divided
between two separate individuals or panels of individuals.
Other - Parties, by agreement, or pursuant to court rules and regula-
tions, may create and utilize other dispute resolution processes before
third party neutral(s) in order to facilitate settlement, manage or plan
discovery and other case issues, seek fact-finding or conciliation serv-
ices, improve communication, simplify or settle parts of cases, arrange
transactions or for other reasons. Such processes may be decisional
(adjudicative), facilitative or a hybrid of the two, and they may be bind-
ing or non-binding as party agreements or court rules or statutes pro-
vide.
Lawyers who provide neutral services as described above shall be
subject to the duties and obligations as specified below.
RULE 4.5.1 DILIGENCE AND COMPETENCE
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(a) A lawyer serving as a third party neutral should act diligently, eff i-
ciently and promptly, subject to the standard of care owed the parties as
required by applicable law or contract.
(b) A lawyer  serving as a third party neutral should decline to serve in
those matters in which the lawyer is not competent to serve.
Comment
Diligence
[1] Like its equivalent in representational work (see Model Rule 1.3,
discussing diligence in the lawyer-client relationship), this Rule requires
the ADR neutral to act diligently, efficiently and promptly, subject to the
duty of care owed the parties by applicable law or contract. Other rules
or specifications of timeliness and standards of care may be specified in
agreements of the parties, rules provided by relevant organizations, or by
applicable case law dealing with mediator or arbitrator civil liability. The
standard of care to be applied to the work of mediators and arbitrators is
currently evolving in practice and case law.
[2] The lawyer neutral should commit the time necessary to promote
prompt resolution of the dispute and should not let other matters inter-
fere with the timely and efficient completion of the matter. If a lawyer
neutral cannot meet the parties’ expectations for prompt, diligent, and
efficient resolution of the dispute, the lawyer neutral should decline to
serve.
[3] While settlement or resolution is the goal of most ADR proc-
esses, the primary responsibility for the resolution of the dispute and the
shaping of a settlement in mediation and evaluation rests with the par-
ties. Accordingly, when serving in a facilitative or evaluative process (see
definitions), the lawyer neutral should not coerce or improperly influ-
ence a party to make a decision, to continue participating in the process,
or to reach settlement or agreement.97
[4] When serving in an adjudicative or evaluative capacity, the law-
yer neutral should decide all matters justly, exercising independent
judgment, without permitting outside pressure to affect the decision.
The lawyer neutral serving in adjudicative or evaluative roles should be
guided by judicial standards of diligence and competence.98
Competence
                                                                                                                                                
97. See  FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS Rule 10.031
(1998).
98. See MODEL CODE OF J UDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B; AAA/ABA C ODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977).
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[5] A lawyer should decline appointment as a neutral when such ap-
pointment is beyond the lawyer’s competence. A lawyer neutral should
serve “only in cases where the neutral has sufficient knowledge [and
skill] regarding the process and subject matter to be effective.”99
[6] In determining whether a lawyer neutral has the requisite
knowledge and skill to serve as neutral in a particular matter and proc-
ess, relevant factors may include: the parties’ reasonable expectations
regarding the ADR process and the neutral’s role, the procedural and
substantive complexity of the matter and process, the lawyer neutral’s
general ADR experience and training, legal experience, subject matter
expertise, the preparation the lawyer neutral is able to give to the matter,
and the feasibility of employing experts or co-neutrals with required
substantive or process expertise. In many instances, a lawyer neutral
may accept a neutral assignment where the requisite level of competence
can be achieved by reasonable preparation.
RULE 4.5.2 CONFIDENTIALITY
(a) A lawyer serving as a third party neutral shall maintain the confi-
dentiality of all information acquired in the course of serving as a third
party neutral, unless the third party neutral is required or permitted by
law or agreement of all the parties to disclose or use any otherwise con-
fidential information.
(1) A third party neutral should discuss confidentiality rules and
requirements with the parties at the beginning of any proceeding and
obtain party consent with respect to any ex parte communication or
practice.
(2) As between the parties, the third party neutral shall maintain
confidentiality for all information disclosed to the third party neutral in
confidence by a party, unless the party agrees or specifies otherwise.
(3) A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not
thereafter use information acquired in the ADR proceeding to the disad-
vantage of any party to the ADR proceeding, except when the informa-
tion has become publicly known or the parties have agreed otherwise or
except when necessary under section (b), below, or to defend the neutral
from a charge of misconduct.
(b) A third party neutral may use or disclose confidential information
obtained during a proceeding when and to the extent the third party be-
lieves necessary to prevent:
(1) death or serious bodily injury from occurring; or
(2) substantial financial loss from occurring in the matter at
hand as the result of a crime or fraud that a party has committed or in-
tends to commit.
(c) Before using or disclosing information pursuant to section (b), if
not otherwise required to be disclosed, the third party neutral must, if
feasible, make a good faith effort to persuade the party’s counsel or the
                                                                                                                                                
99. SPIDR, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOCIETY OF
PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION  (1986).
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party, if the party is unrepresented, either not to act or to warn those
who might be harmed by the party’s action.
Comment
[1] ADR confidentiality is distinctly different from lawyer-client
confidentiality, which is defeated when adverse parties reveal informa-
tion to each other or in the presence of a third party. The extent of ADR
confidentiality protections can be determined by contract, court rules,
statutes, or other professional norms or rules. This Rule addresses the
confidentiality responsibilities of the lawyer neutral and delineates the
neutral’s duties to the parties, the process, and the public.100
[2] Principles of confidentiality are given effect in the laws of evi-
dence (which govern evidentiary uses, restrictions and privileges) and in
ethics rules (which establish professional ethical obligations). Privileges
apply in judicial and other proceedings in which the lawyer neutral may
be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence re-
garding an ADR process. The rule of confidentiality in professional eth-
ics applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from
the lawyer neutral through compulsion of law. This Rule is intended to
provide the ADR neutral and parties with confidentiality protections for
ADR processes where privacy of the process and unguarded, candid
communications are central to their use and effectiveness.
[3] Since there is no attorney-client relationship between parties and
lawyer neutrals, and because most disclosures of information in most
forms of ADR occur in the presence of the other party, the confidentiality
protection guaranteed to clients by their representational lawyers by
Model Rule 1.6 (as well as the evidentiary privilege of attorney-client)
does not apply in most ADR settings.
[4] The general rule that lawyers may divulge confidences to facili-
tate law practice within the firm is not applicable in ADR confidentiality,
especially mediation. “Since the essence of mediation is the preservation
of confidential communications, most lawyer-mediators are scrupulous
not to disclose such confidential information to anyone, even attorneys
in their own firm. Mediators may discuss fact patterns or mediation is-
sues with other mediators within the firm or the community of media-
tors. As a matter of routine, most mediators will screen such comments
to ensure that they never reveal names or confidential information.”101
[5] This Rule imposes an ethical duty of confidentiality on the ADR
neutral to protect the ADR process and the parties. The rule’s confiden-
                                                                                                                                                
100. See  Poly Software Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995); Cho v. Su -
perior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (1995); Symposium, Confidentiality in Mediation, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Winter 1999.
101. James E. McGuire, Conflicts in Subsequent Representation, DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Spring 1996, at 4.
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tiality standards can be altered by agreement of all parties or applicable
law.
Many jurisdictions and courts provide confidentiality protections to
parties and ADR neutrals as a matter of law. While some statutes are
narrowly evidentiary in nature and govern only the use of information in
a court proceeding, other mediation confidentiality provisions include
both evidentiary restrictions and broader prohibitions against disclo-
sure.102 Additionally, confidentiality is often provided by contract among
parties and neutrals in private forums.103
[6] Since ADR confidentiality can be governed by different and
sometimes conflicting sources of law and ethical duties, it is important
that the parties and the neutral understand the extent and uncertainties
of the ADR confidentiality protections. Accordingly, section (1) requires
the third party neutral to discuss the applicable confidentiality rules with
the parties and counsel at the beginning of the process.
Statutory or common law privileges, evidence codes, protective or-
ders issued by courts under discovery or other statutes, as well as party
contracts and court rules all can affect the scope of confidentiality for the
parties, the third party neutral and others outside of the particular mat-
ter.104 Some states, for example, require mediators to disclose certain
information, like the occurrence of child abuse or domestic violence.105
Additionally this Rule, like the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission’s pro-
posed revision of Model Rule 1.6 and the forthcoming Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers, section 117, permits disclosure of infor-
mation to prevent imminent bodily harm or substantial financial loss.
See Comment [10] below.
[7] In addition to advising the parties about the scope of confidenti-
ality protections under law and applicable agreement, section (1) also
requires the neutral to discuss and obtain party consent regarding the
nature of ex parte communications, if any, contemplated by the process.
In some mediation processes, for example, parties meet separately with
the mediator and share information confidentially. In arbitration proc-
esses, ex-parte communications with partisan arbitrators may be per-
mitted under certain rules and prohibited under others.106
                                                                                                                                                
102. See  NANCY ROGERS & C RAIG MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, P OLICY AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1994) (noting that state legislatures have enacted over 200 mediation statutes); ELIZABETH
PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A
SOURCEBOOK FOR J UDGES AND LAWYERS (1996) (noting that federal district courts provide for
confidentiality of ADR processes by local rule or court orders).
103. See, e.g., MODEL ADR PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES: MEDIATION PROCEDURE para. 9
(CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 1998) (containing confidentiality provision); MODEL ADR
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICES: CONFIDENTIALITY (CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 1998).
104. See  ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 102.
105. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE  § 11164 (1993).
106. See, e.g., AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Canon VII.C(2) (1977) (permitting ex-parte communications between the non-neutral arbitra-
tor and the party who appointed them); CPR RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION Rule
9.3 (1998) (prohibiting ex-parte communications with neutral or party-appointed arbitrators).
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[8] Given the extensive use in mediation of separate, ex parte meet-
ings or caucuses with the mediator, parties and their lawyers may reveal
information in caucus that is not to be disclosed to the other party with-
out permission. Section (2) establishes that the neutral shall maintain
the confidentiality of all information disclosed to the third party in con-
fidence, unless the party agrees or specifies otherwise. In effect, all in-
formation revealed in confidence in ex-parte sessions or through other
confidential means, is to be considered confidential, absent a specific
statement or agreement by the party otherwise.
[9] Section (3) prohibits the neutral from using any information ac-
quired in the ADR proceeding to the disadvantage of any party, subject
to the exceptions stated in the rule. This formulation tracks the current
Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) for conflicts of interest for representational attor-
neys and former clients. Particularly in mediation or other ADR fora
where ex parte sessions are used, the third party neutral may hear in-
formation or settlement facts that may not be legally relevant but are
highly sensitive or proprietary. Under this rule, the lawyer neutral is
prohibited from using this information in subsequent neutral or repre-
sentational work to the disadvantage of the former ADR party.
[10]  Like the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission’s proposed version of
Model Rule 1.6 and the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, section 117, this rule permits disclosure by the neutral third
party of information to prevent death or serious bodily harm to anyone
on the basis of any information learned, and disclosure to prevent sub-
stantial financial loss from occurring in the matter at hand, as a result of
a crime or fraud one of the parties has committed or intends to commit.
Several states, notably New Jersey and Florida, require (not just permit)
lawyers to reveal information to prevent death or serious bodily harm, as
well as to avoid some criminal acts or fraud on the tribunal, even when
learned in an otherwise confidentially-protected situation. 107
In many jurisdictions, third party neutrals are already under an obli-
gation to reveal such information under separate statutes or case law.108
RULE 4.5.3 IMPARTIALITY
(a) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should be impartial
with respect to the issues and the parties in the matter.
(1) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should conduct
all proceedings in an impartial, unbiased and evenhanded manner,
treating all parties with fairness and respect. If at any time the lawyer is
unable to conduct the process in an impartial manner, the lawyer shall
withdraw, unless prohibited from doing so by applicable law.
                                                                                                                                                
107. See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
108. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE  § 11164 (1992) (requiring child abuse to be reported);
IDAHO RULES OF EVID. 507(4) (1998) (stating that child abuse discovered during mediation is
not a protected confidence); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 449-50
(1976) (placing an affirmative duty on psychologist to inform patient’s intended victim of dan -
ger).
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(2) A lawyer serving in a third party neutral capacity should not
allow other matters to interfere with the lawyer’s impartiality.
(3) When serving in an adjudicative capacity, the lawyer shall
decide all matters fairly, with impartiality, exercising independent judg-
ment and without any improper outside influence.
(b) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should:
(1) Disclose to the parties all circumstances, reasonably known to
the lawyer, why the lawyer might not be perceived to be impartial. These
circumstances include (I) any financial or personal interest in the out-
come; (II) any existing or past financial, business, professional, family or
social relationship with any of the parties, including, but not limited to,
any prior representation of any of the parties, their counsel and wit-
nesses, or service as an ADR neutral for any of the parties; (III) any
other source of bias or prejudice concerning a person or institution
which is likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create an
appearance of partiality or bias; and (IV) any other disclosures required
of the lawyer by law or contract.
(2) Conduct a reasonable inquiry and effort to determine if any
interests or biases described in section (b)(1) exist, and maintain a con-
tinuing obligation to disclose any such interests or potential biases which
may arise during the proceedings.
(3) Decline to participate as a third party neutral unless all par-
ties choose to retain the neutral, following all such disclosures, unless
contract or applicable law requires participation. If, however, the lawyer
believes that the matters disclosed would inhibit the lawyer’s impartial-
ity, the lawyer should decline to proceed.
(c) All disclosures under section (b) extend to those of the lawyer,
members of his or her family, his or her current employer, partners or
business associates.
(d) After accepting appointment and while serving as a neutral, a
lawyer shall not enter into any financial, business, professional, family or
social relationship or acquire any financial or personal interest which is
likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create the appear-
ance of partiality or bias, without disclosure and consent of all parties.
Comment
Impartiality
[1] Impartiality means freedom from favoritism or bias either by
word or action, and a commitment to serve the process and all parties
equally. Section (a) codifies established concepts of neutrality and neu-
tral conduct.
Disclosure
[2] Understanding that absolute neutrality is unobtainable even un-
der the best circumstances, this rule establishes a broad and continuing
standard of disclosure by lawyer neutrals with the possibility of waiver
by the parties. The rule describes the circumstances which should be dis-
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closed in determining whether the neutral third party is without imper-
missible partiality and bias to serve in the particular matter. This form of
disclosure is accepted practice in ADR proceedings, including both arbi-
tration and mediation.
A lawyer, as prospective neutral, should err on the side of disclosure
because it is better that the relationship or other matter be disclosed at
the outset when the parties are free to reject the prospective neutral or to
accept the person with knowledge of the relationship.109 While there is
often disagreement over what may reasonably constitute a potential
conflict, the growing acceptance of the principle of disclosure acts as
some reassurance that potentially disadvantaged parties will be given an
opportunity to object or at least investigate further.110 Conversely, it al-
lows all parties to select a neutral after full disclosure, where the parties
knowingly decide to go forward.
[3] Where possible, best practices suggest that the disclosures
should be in writing, as should any subsequent waivers or consents.
While the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission revision of Model Rule 1.7
currently requires written disclosures of all representational conflicts
and waivers, this section advises, but does not require, the preparation
of written disclosures and consents.111
[4] What constitutes reasonable inquiry and effort by the lawyer
neutral to uncover interests or relationships requiring disclosure de-
pends on the circumstances. Typically, in matters where the parties are
represented, this will involve the prospective lawyer neutral obtaining
from the parties a complete identification of the parties, their represen-
tatives, insurers, lawyers, witnesses and attendees at the ADR proceed-
ing and submitting the list to the prospective neutral’s conflicts system.112
We note that there may be a tension under the law between the duty to
disclose prior matters, clients, financial holdings, etc., and the confiden-
tiality required to be maintained with respect to ongoing or concluded
representations and ADR proceedings.
The rule defines the scope of required disclosure to include immedi-
ate family members, and business partners and associates as defined in
Model Rule 1.8 (i).113 It also follows Rule 1.10 and The Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers, section 203, for definitions of business asso-
ciations and law firm associations.114 The rule does not follow the Judi-
cial Code of Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(d).
                                                                                                                                                
109. See  Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968)
(White, J., concurring).
110. See  Christopher Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in Mediation, 1985 MO. J. OF DISP.
RESOL. 141 (1985).
111. Cf. Calif. Arbitration Statute, CAL. CIV. PROC . CODE § 1281.9(a) (Deering 1998) (re-
cording the California Arbitration Statute and requiring all conflict disclosures in writ ing).
112. See  Al-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680, 681-83 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
113. The ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission is currently considering changes to this Model
Rule of Professional Conduct.
114. The proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers was ratified by the Ameri-
can Law Institute in May 1999.
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[5] Where a lawyer neutral volunteers to act as a neutral at the re-
quest of a court, public agency or other group for a de minimis period
and pro bono publico, section (b)(2) recognizes that there may not be
opportunity for full inquiry, disclosure or disqualification challenge. In
such circumstances, a third party neutral may have to proceed with the
minimal inquiry and disclosure that may be reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. If the lawyer, from memory, recognizes an interest or rela-
tionship relevant to the case, the lawyer should identify that interest or
relationship. Otherwise, the lawyer should disclose the general nature of
the lawyer neutral’s practice and affiliations with law firms or other as-
sociations, or other known disqualifying circumstances.115
[6] In general, parties may elect to retain a lawyer as neutral after
the latter’s disclosure of reasons why the lawyer reasonably might be
perceived not to be neutral. However, section (b)(3) imposes on the law-
yer neutral the obligation to decline to serve if the lawyer-neutral be-
lieves that the matters disclosed, or other circumstances, would inhibit
the lawyer’s impartiality or otherwise impugn the integrity of the proc-
ess. In such instances, the lawyer neutral should decline to serve even if
the parties consent to the lawyer’s retention as a neutral.
[7] Section (d) tracks language from the Code of Ethics for Arbitra-
tors in Commercial Disputes, currently under revision, and is intended
to prevent partiality from developing through the acquisition of future
business during the pendency of an ADR proceeding. The parties may
consent to waive this provision. The consent provision may prevent diffi-
culties for third party neutrals engaged to mediate or arbitrate a number
of disputes with the same party, either through contractual appointment
pre-dispute or through multiple, simultaneous appointments or ap-
pointments during the pendency of a particular case.
RULE 4.5.4 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
(a) Disqualification of Individual Third Party Neutrals
(1) A lawyer who is serving as a third party neutral shall not,
during the course of an ADR proceeding, seek to establish any financial,
business, representational, neutral or personal relationship with or ac-
quire an interest in, any party, entity or counsel who is involved in the
matter in which the lawyer is participating as a neutral, unless all parties
consent after full disclosure.
(2) A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not
subsequently represent any party to the ADR proceeding (in which the
third party neutral served as neutral) in the same or a substantially re-
lated matter, unless all parties consent after full disclosure.
(3) A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not
subsequently represent a party adverse to a former ADR party where the
                                                                                                                                                
115. See infra proposed Rule 4.5.4(b).
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lawyer neutral has acquired information protected by confidentiality un-
der this Rule, without the consent of the former ADR party.
(4) Where the circumstances might reasonably create the ap-
pearance that the neutral had been influenced in the ADR process by the
anticipation or expectation of a subsequent relationship or interest, a
lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not subsequently ac-
quire an interest in, or represent, a party to the ADR proceeding in a
substantially unrelated matter for a period of one year or other reason-
able period of time under the circumstances, unless all parties consent
after full disclosure.
(b) Imputation of Conflicts to Affiliated Lawyers and Removing Im-
putation
(1) If a lawyer is disqualified by section (a), no lawyer who is af-
filiated with that lawyer may knowingly undertake or continue repre-
sentation in any substantially related or unrelated matter unless the per-
sonally disqualified lawyer is adequately screened from any participation
in the matter, is apportioned no fee from the matter and timely and ade-
quate notice of the screening has been provided to all affected parties
and tribunals, provided that no material confidential information about
any of the parties to the ADR proceeding has been communicated by the
personally disqualified lawyer to the affiliated lawyer or that lawyer’s
firm.
(c) A lawyer selected as a partisan arbitrator of a party in a multi-
member arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently repre-
senting that party, nor are any affiliated lawyers.
(d) If a lawyer serves as a neutral at the request of a court, public
agency or other group for a de minimis period and pro bono publico, the
firm with which the lawyer is associated is not subject to imputation un-
der section (b).
Comment
Conflicts
[1] ADR conflicts policy, like all conflicts regulation, has two main
objectives: to protect the parties from actual harm suffered by conflicts
of interest, and to protect the process, the public, and the parties from
the “appearance” of improper influences. In the ADR context, it is es-
sential that conflicts rules protect against both actual harm and the ap-
pearance of self-interest.
Modern law practice is increasingly characterized by lawyer mobility,
both externally where lawyers move among law firms and organizations,
and internally where lawyers on a case-by-case basis move from repre-
sentative to neutral roles within their law firms and through association
with other private or public organizations (such as court or bar volunteer
ADR programs). This Rule strives to protect against both actual harm
from lawyer role changes,116 and to protect the ADR processes, the lawyer
                                                                                                                                                
116. See  Poly Software Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995). The court
disqualified a lawyer-mediator from representing a litigant in a subsequent matter related to an
earlier case in which the mediator had received confidences from the parties. See id.; see also
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neutrals, the parties and the public against the corrosive but less tangible
“appearance of impropriety” or “public” harms which threaten the integ-
rity of these processes, the neutrality of the lawyer neutrals, and the
public’s confidence in these dispute resolution procedures.117
[2] Section (a)(1) governs conflicts that may arise during the
pendency of an ADR process and is intended to be a bar against using
the ADR process to obtain additional employment or other benefit. Con-
flicts arising under this section can be consented to by all parties after
full disclosure.
[3] Section (a)(2) prohibits future representational roles by lawyer
neutrals in the same or substantially related matters, absent disclosure
and consent by all parties. This section codifies the rule established in
Poly Software: “Where a mediator has received confidential information
in the course of a mediation, that mediator should not thereafter repre-
sent anyone in connection with the same or a substantially factually re-
lated matter unless all parties to the mediation consent after disclosure.”
Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1495. We believe that the logic behind
Poly Software’s prohibition of future representational relationships in
the same or substantially related cases also applies to adjudicative proc-
esses such as arbitration. Accordingly, under this Rule, a neutral arbi-
trator is subject to the same restrictions as a mediator, although a parti-
san arbitrator is excepted from these restrictions by section (c).
[4] Conflicts may exist when lawyer neutrals, who have facilitated
disputes and learned confidential and proprietary information about the
disputing parties, are asked to represent a party adverse to a former
ADR party. When trying to facilitate solutions, third party neutrals may
learn significant “settlement facts”—proprietary information about enti-
ties or individuals learned within the neutral setting that may not be le-
gally relevant but that affect the possibility of settlement.118 In this situa-
tion, the conflicts issue is whether an ADR neutral who learned facts
(e.g., about financial solvency, human relations, product development,
acquisitions or entity future plans) during the ADR would or could use
those facts against the former ADR party in the subsequent representa-
tion. Section (a)(3) addresses this situation by prohibiting a lawyer neu-
tral from representing a party adverse to a former ADR party where the
lawyer neutral has acquired settlement facts or other information pro-
                                                                                                                                                
Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 863-64 (1995). The court di squalified the law firm
as counsel after the firm hired the retired judge who had previously presided over the action
and had participated in settlement conferences with the parties. See id. The court also rejected
the use of Rule 1.12 for screening of a former judge or arbitrator.
117. See  Cho , 45 Cal. Rptr. at 863. Although the firm had established a screening process to
shield the former judge from the case, and the judge stated that he had no recall of the settle-
ment conferences, the court stated that “no one could have confidence in the in tegrity of a legal
process” where the former judge who received ex-parte revelations from one of the parties joins
the opposing counsel’s law firm.
118. See Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement, supra note 1.
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tected by this rule’s confidentiality provision, Rule 4.5.2, absent consent
by the former ADR party.
[5] Section (a)(4) addresses potential future representational or
other relationships between the lawyer neutral and a party to the prior
ADR in unrelated cases. The bar often refers to these relationships as
“downstream conflicts.” This section is designed to protect against the
appearance or the actuality that an expectation of a beneficial future re-
lationship or interest has influenced the neutral’s conduct in the pre-
ceding ADR process. The language in this section is derived from Canon
I.D. of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (AAA-
ABA, 1997) (currently under revision).119
Imputation and Screening
[6] This rule follows the trend of the Restatement of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers to provide for screening of lawyer neutrals disqualified
under section (a) in unrelated or substantially related matters. This for-
mulation continues to impute disqualification to the whole firm for the
same matter.120 This rule is premised, in part, on the different confiden-
tiality obligations of third party neutrals and lawyer representatives.
Unlike lawyers representing clients, lawyer neutrals generally should not
share information with other lawyers in their firm, and thus are particu-
larly well suited for screening. See Comment [4] to Rule 4.5.2, Confi-
dentiality.
An alternative formulation, which the Drafting Committee rejected,
would apply the current non-screen, imputation formulation of Model
Rule 1.10. This rule would read: “Unless all affected parties consent after
disclosure, in any matter where a lawyer would be disqualified under
section (a), the restrictions imposed therein also restrict all other law-
yers who are affiliated with that lawyer under Rule 1.10.” We believe that
a no-screen imputation rule is contrary to the trend in the law, as noted
above, and would inappropriately limit the growth of mixed neutral and
representational roles for lawyers, with its attendant benefits to both the
practice and the public.
[7] Screening in the ADR context involves the same actions as
screening in other contexts.121 In addition, under the proposed Rule, no-
                                                                                                                                                
119. This Rule provides for a presumptive one-year period of disqualification, but also pro-
vides flexibility to shorten or lengthen the disqualification period, as circumstances require.
Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prefer general and not time-based rules, the
Drafting Committee and consulting member Professor Geoffrey Hazard believe that a pre-
sumptive one-year safe-harbor period is preferable to a general rule of reasonableness, given
the substantial need among lawyers and law firms for a clearly defined rule. Understanding that
the time-based rule will not be appropriate in all circumstances, a rule of reasonableness is also
included.
120. See  Cho v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (1995) (screening not
sufficient to defeat law firm’s disqualification when the judge who heard the action and pre-
sided over confidential, ex parte settlement conferences joined the opposing party’s law firm).
121. See, e.g.,  MODEL RULES Rule 1.11(a)(1) (permitting the law firm of a former govern -
ment lawyer to undertake or continue representation in a matter in which the former govern -
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tice of the screening must be provided to all affected parties and tribu-
nals.
[8] Section (c) excepts partisan, party-appointed arbitrators from
the restrictions on future representational work under section (a), and
from imputation and screening under section (b). We note, however, the
lack of consensus regarding the role and practices of partisan arbitrators,
and suggest that if “partisan” arbitrators become more like neutral arbi-
trators, section (c) will have to be amended.
[9] Section (d) excepts lawyer neutrals and their affiliated lawyers
from the imputation and screening rule when the lawyer neutral volun-
teers his or her services at the request of a court, other public agency, or
institution and serves for a de minimis period.
                                                                                                                                                
ment lawyer participated personally and substantially if the lawyer is screened from further
participation in it, including receipt of fees from it). Annotated Model Rule 1.11 states: “An ef-
fective screen commonly includes the following factors: (1) the disqualified lawyer does not
participate in the matter, (2) the disqualified lawyer does not discuss the matter with any mem-
ber of the firm, (3) the disqualified lawyer represents through sworn testimony that he or she
had not imparted any confidential information to the firm, (4) the disqualified lawyer does not
have access to any files or documents relating to the matter; and (5) the disqualified lawyer
does not share in any of the fees from the matter.” See  ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 186 (3d ed. 1996).
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RULE 4.5.5 FEES
(a) Before or within a reasonable time after being retained as a third
party neutral, a lawyer should communicate to the parties, in writing,
the basis or rate and allocation of the fee for service, unless the third
party neutral is serving in a no-fee or pro bono capacity.
(b) A third party neutral who withdraws from a case should return
any unearned fee to the parties.
(c) A third party neutral who charges a fee dependent on the settle-
ment or other specific resolution of the matter should explain to the par-
ties that such an arrangement gives the third party neutral a direct fi-
nancial interest in settlement that may conflict with the parties’ possible
interest in terminating the proceedings without reaching settlement. The
third party neutral should consider whether such a fee arrangement cre-
ates an appearance or actuality of partiality, inconsistent with the re-
quirements of Rule 4.5.3.
Comment
[1] This rule requires a written communication specifying the basis,
rate and allocation of fees to all parties, unless the third party neutral is
serving in a no-fee or pro bono capacity.
[2] It has become relatively common to use contingent fee or bonus
compensation schemes to provide an incentive to participate in ADR or
to reward the achievement of an effective settlement. Section (3) of the
rule does not prohibit contingent fees (which some jurisdictions or pro-
vider organizations do) but requires the third party neutral to explain
what the effects of such a fee arrangement may be, including conflicts of
interest. This rule imposes two obligations on the neutral. The lawyer
neutral is required to assess the possible conflicts attendant to use of
contingent fees and whether the appearance or actuality of partiality
prohibits its use under Rule 4.5.3, Impartiality. If use of the compensa-
tion arrangements is not prohibited under that standard, the neutral is
required to disclose the possible consequences of this fee arrangement to
the parties. Contingent fees have not been totally prohibited by this rule
because of their use in creating incentives for some parties to participate
in mediation or other settlement activities.
RULE 4.5.6 FAIRNESS AND INTEGRITY OF THE PROCESS
(a) The lawyer serving as third party neutral should make reasonable
efforts to determine that the ADR proceedings utilized are explained to
the parties and their counsel, and that the parties knowingly consent to
the process being used and the neutral selected (unless applicable law or
contract requires use of a particular process or third party neutral).
(b) The third party neutral should not engage in any process or pro-
cedure not consented to by the parties (unless required by applicable law
or contract).
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(c) The third party neutral should use all reasonable efforts to con-
duct the process with fairness to all parties. The third party neutral
should be especially diligent that parties who are not represented have
adequate opportunities to be heard and involved in any ADR proceed-
ings.
(d) The third party neutral should make reasonable efforts to prevent
misconduct that would invalidate any settlement. The third party neutral
should also make reasonable efforts to determine that the parties have
reached agreement of their own volition and knowingly consent to any
settlement.
Comment
[1] While ethical rules cannot guarantee the specific procedures or
fairness of a process, this rule is intended to require third party neutrals
to be attentive to the basic values and goals informing fair dispute reso-
lution. These values include party autonomy; party choice of process (to
the extent permitted by law or contract); party choice of and consent to
the choice of the third party neutral (to the extent permitted by law or
contract); and fairness of the conduct of the process itself. This Rule is
concerned not only with specific harms to particular participating par-
ties but with the appearance of the integrity of the process to the public
and other possible users of these processes.122
[2] This section requires third party neutrals to make reasonable
efforts to determine that the parties have reached an agreement of their
own volition, one that is not coerced. While some have suggested that
third party neutrals should bear some moral accountability or legal re-
sponsibility for the agreements they help facil itate,123 these Rules do not
make the third party neutral the guarantor of a fair or just result.
                                                                                                                                                
122. The proposed Rule articulates a preferred rule of party choice and autonomy, about
the type of process (including whether mediation is facilitative or evaluative), whether caucuses
are to be used or not, and the selection of the neutral. This may not be possible in situations
where processes are mandated, either by contract (adhesion or freely negotiated) or by court
rules and requirements. The questions implicated in the fairness and integrity of the process
are very controversial at the present time (including legal cha llenges to compulsory arbitration
clauses in some contracts) and thus, we (or the appropriate ABA ethics body) might conclude
that such a matter is too “substantive” or too unsettled for rule-making at this time.
As we write this, the case law is rapidly changing. The U. S. Supreme Court r ecently held that
an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement must clearly and unmistakably state
that federal anti-discrimination claims are subject to arbitration. See  Wright v. Universal Mari-
time Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has refused to enforce arb i-
tration in several employment cases where the plaintiffs did not knowingly agree to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims. See  Duffield v. Richardson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th
Cir. 1998); see also  Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997); Nelson
v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997).
The California Supreme Court also raised serious questions about the fairness and en forc e-
ability of Kaiser’s contractual mandatory medical malpractice arbitration. See  Engalla v. Kaiser
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (1997). Engalla has lead to a comprehen-
sive assessment and restructuring of the Kaiser arbitration process by outside experts. See  THE
BLUE R IBBON ADVISORY PANEL ON KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION, THE KAISER PERMANENTE
ARBITRATION SYSTEM: A REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT  (January 5, 1998).
123. See  Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 9
VT. L. REV. 1 (1981). The Kutak Commission rejected an earlier effort to prevent lawyers from
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[3] This section of the Rule is designed to prevent harm not only to
parties engaged in dispute resolution processes, but to the appearances
presented to the general public of how legal processes are conducted.
Although this section of the Rule may suffer from the same complaints
about vagueness as the former Canon 9 “appearance of impropriety” did
under the old structure of the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, the drafters believe that where lawyers “switch” sides and roles, from
partisan to neutral, it is important to provide for basic criteria of fairness
to be monitored in the process for the acceptability and legitimacy of the
process and the lawyers within it.
                                                                                                                                                
facilitating negotiated agreements that would be held unconscionable as a matter of law. See
MODEL RULES proposed Rule 4.3 (draft version 1980).
